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Investor Mood, Herding and the Ramadan Effect 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In view of evidence linking herding and social mood, we examine whether the positive mood 
documented during Ramadan translates into higher herding compared to non-Ramadan days. 
Drawing on a sample of seven majority Muslim countries, we report significant herding 
during Ramadan in most of our sample markets. Additionally, we show that herding appears 
significantly stronger within rather than outside Ramadan for most tests whereby its 
significance is manifested on both Ramadan- and non-Ramadan-days. Overall, herding 
significance within/outside Ramadan exhibits some variation in its levels across markets in 
relation to variables reflective of market states, both domestically (market returns; market 
volume) and internationally (US market returns; US investors’ sentiment; global financial 
crisis) market states. 
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1. Introduction 
Religion is identified in several studies as a key factor underlying aspects of the economic 
and financial environment. From individual investors’ perspective, religion has been found to 
affect the propensity to save (Guiso et al., 2003; Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012), the 
decision to invest in stocks (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012) and risk-attitudes (Miller and 
Hoffmann, 1995; Barsky et al., 1997; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Kumar, 2009; Kumar et al., 
2011). From an aggregate market perspective, religion has been shown to affect IPO-
underpricing (Kumar et al., 2011), economic growth (Barro and McCleary, 2003) and 
creditor protection (Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  
An area that has recently witnessed much research interest is that of investors’ mood and 
how the latter is shaped by religious occasions. In general, the evidence suggests that mood 
and emotions play an important role in investor behavior.
1
 In fact, Shu (2010) argues that the 
higher the complexity of a decision and the uncertainty of its outcome, the higher the impact 
of mood in decision making. A positive mood state can make investors more optimistic and 
willing to undertake riskier investment decisions (Wright & Bower, 1992). The proxy 
variables that have been used in the relevant studies in order to gauge social mood include 
weather (Saunders, 1993), biorhythms (Kamstra et al., 2003) and beliefs relating to Lunar 
phases or Friday 13
th
 (Dowling & Lucey, 2005).  
With respect to the role of religion in affecting investor mood and behavior, Pantzalis & 
Ucar (2014) examined the impact of the Easter week holiday on investors’ behavior in the 
U.S. This religious practice is found to cause investors distraction which may lead to delayed 
reaction to firm news. Frieder & Subrahmanyam (2004) examined the impact of the Jewish 
High Holy Days (i.e., Rosh HaShanah and Yom Kippur) on U.S. stock returns and dollar 
volume. During both Holy days there is a significant decline in dollar volume, while stock 
                                                          
1
 Loewenstein et al. (2001); Lucey & Dowling (2005); Nofsinger (2005), Shu (2010), Summers & Duxbury 
(2012), Abu Bakar et al. (2014) and Siganos et al. (2014). 
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returns are significantly positive around Rosh HaShanah and significantly negative around 
Yom Kippur.
2
 Frieder & Subrahmanyam (2004) attribute these phenomena to Jewish investor 
sentiment.
3
  In addition, the positive mood effects of Ramadan on investor behavior have 
been identified in a series of studies which examined stock returns in Muslim countries (Al-
Hajieh et al., 2011; Białkowski et al., 2012; Al-Khazali, 2014). In general, these studies 
suggest that stock returns are significantly higher during Ramadan than non-Ramadan days.  
Motivated by this evidence, the fact that Ramadan has been shown to be associated with 
overall positive mood, expressed through optimism and enhanced social interactions, and the 
well documented relation of social mood with herding (e.g., Prechter 2001; Parker & 
Prechter, 2005; Olson, 2006), the first question we consider in this study is whether herding 
exists in majority Muslim countries during the Ramadan-month. Additionally, if herding does 
exist, we ask whether its existence is more significant within Ramadan days compared to 
non-Ramadan days. More specifically, given that Ramadan is characterized by increased 
positive mood and social interaction (both of which are contributing factors to herding) 
among Muslims, we would expect that this would lead to an increase on the level of herd 
behavior during the Ramadan period. A third question is whether controlling for a variety of 
(domestic and international) market states produces an effect over the relationship between 
herding and Ramadan given the sensitivity of herding to market conditions (see e.g. Chang et 
al., 2000). It is these three questions that our study addresses.  
Our findings reveal evidence of herding significance within-Ramadan for most (five out 
of seven) of our sample markets (Malaysia and Pakistan are the exceptions). Furthermore, 
                                                          
2
 The authors argue that days around Rosh HaShanah (the Jewish New Year) are associated with positive mood, 
overconfidence and under-estimation of risk, leading to higher stock market returns. On the contrary, Yom 
Kippur, as a day of regret, induces negative mood and subsequently lead to negative market returns.  
3
 Even though Jews constitute a relatively low proportion of the U.S. population, their economic impact appears 
disproportionate to its size. The authors outline the Jewish community’s importance on the U.S. financial 
community referring to the contribution of Jewish companies such as Goldman Sachs & Co. and Salomon 
Brothers, among others, to investment banking. In addition, the authors refer to the higher income of Jews 
relative to other ethnic groups in the U.S. Based on the above arguments, the authors support their hypothesis 
that Jewish investors have a significant impact on the U.S. stock market. 
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when herding is significant both within and outside Ramadan, its magnitude within-Ramadan 
is always higher than outside Ramadan. Overall, herding significance within/outside 
Ramadan exhibits some variation in its levels across markets in relation to variables that 
reflect domestic (market returns; market volume) or international (US market returns; US 
investors’ sentiment; global financial crisis) market states.  
These results make original contributions to the literature on the effects of social norms 
on markets (e.g., Hong et al., 2004; Hong et al., 2005; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009), herding 
(Prechter 2001; Parker & Prechter, 2005; Olson, 2006) and Islamic finance in particular (Al-
Hajieh et al., 2011; Białkowski et al., 2012; Al-Khazali, 2014). First, our findings are in line 
with social norm theory which argues that individuals follow the behavioral norms, beliefs 
and/or actions of other community members (Akerlof, 1980; Romer, 1984), with a focus on 
religious social norms. While previous Ramadan-related studies make inferences about the 
impact of Ramadan upon investors’ behavior indirectly (by examining Ramadan as a seasonal 
anomaly), we test directly for the Ramadan-effect over a widely documented manifestation of 
investors’ behavior, namely herding. As the first-ever study of the effect of religion over 
herding, our work contributes substantially to the wider literature on the role of religion in 
finance.
4
 Second, to the extent that social interactions and positive sentiment constitute 
Ramadan’s two key behavioral features, our work at the aggregate market level confirms 
prior evidence from microdata-based research (Hong et al., 2004; Hong et al., 2005; Liao et 
al., 2011) on the relevance of these two features to the propensity to herd. Third, our study 
helps showcase Ramadan as a sentiment-proxy when researching majority Muslim markets in 
terms of herding and other behavioral phenomena.
5
  
                                                          
4
 See Glaeser & Scheinkman (2003) for a discussion on the importance of social interactions (or peer effects) 
more generally for a variety of economic outcomes. 
5
 The effect of sentiment has been depicted to date with regards to several behavioral patterns, including 
feedback trading (Chau et al., 2011) and momentum (Antoniou et al, 2013).  
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From an Islamic finance viewpoint, useful implications arise for traders with exposure to 
equity markets of majority Muslim countries, as our results provide insight into investors’ 
behavior during a month which entails abnormally high returns. For example, in recent years, 
there has been a surge of products either investing in Muslim countries or compliant with 
Shariah principles.
6
 Specifically, investors might take advantage of the abnormal returns 
during Ramadan. However, they should be cautious about the destabilizing potential of 
herding which may lead to an increase of systemic risk.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature on herding and mood and states our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the method and 
the data employed. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Herd behavior and mood 
Herding pertains to similarity in behavior following interactive observation of actions or 
actions-payoffs (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). In short, investors herd when they sideline their 
private signals, choosing to mimic their fellow investors instead (Hwang & Salmon (2004). 
From a theoretical viewpoint, herding can be classified as intentional or spurious 
(Bikhchandani & Sharma, 2000; Holmes et al., 2013; Gavriilidis et al., 2013).  
An investor herds intentionally when his imitation is motivated by the anticipation of a 
benefit in an environment characterized by some sort of asymmetry. This is usually either 
informational or professional in nature. From an informational perspective, investors resort 
to herding when experiencing a state of (actual or perceived) informational disadvantage. For 
example, they may possess information of low quality or have inadequate information-
processing skills compared to their peers (Devenow & Welch, 1996). In the extreme, if many 
                                                          
6
 Shariah is an Islamic Jurisprudence. 
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investors choose to follow the information of those they consider better informed, this can 
reduce the wealth of the public information pool and lead to cascading phenomena (Banerjee, 
1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Herding can also arise due to professional considerations, 
in particular among investment professionals, as a result of differences in their ability or 
reputation. Where fund managers are assessed periodically on a relative basis, low 
performing managers (“bad” managers) may consider mimicking the actions of their better-
able peers (“good” managers) (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990).  
Investors herd spuriously when that action is the result of a common element in their 
environment. Examples include relative homogeneity (DeBondt & Teh, 1997) and 
characteristic trading (Bennett, 2003). Relative homogeneity refers to similarities in the 
educational background, signals (e.g., ratios) received and their processing by investment 
professionals (Wermers, 1999). The regulatory environment can also induce herding, if its 
provisions limit the scope for investments.
7
 Characteristic trading (also known as style 
investing) refers to investments based on specific stock characteristics (e.g., past 
performance, price-to-earnings ratio, sector), thus leading to the employment of “investment 
styles” (e.g., momentum, value/growth).  
A series of studies have demonstrated the importance of social interaction in general, and 
social mood in particular, as a driving force of herding. Olson (2006) suggests that emotions 
are prone to contagion among members in a group. Prechter (2001) suggests that fads and 
trends in financial markets are caused by emotions, which can lead investors to herd 
unconsciously. In addition, Parker & Prechter (2005) show that, under conditions of 
uncertainty, unconscious herding impulses determine social mood, which in turn drives social 
actions, such as investing in the stock market. Hong et al., (2004) show how social interaction 
                                                          
7
 A typical example of this is documented in the pension funds of emerging markets, whose regulatory 
authorities constrain the opportunity set of stocks they can invest into by placing risk-profiling restrictions in 
equity-selection. For more on this see Olivares (2008) and Voronkova & Bohl (2005). 
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can foster herding among retail investors if it is used for observational learning purposes,
8
 
while Hong et al., (2005) demonstrate that US fund managers located in the same city exhibit 
enhanced interaction which leads them to buy (sell) similar stocks. In relation to the role of 
sentiment in herding, Liao et al., (2011) find that US institutional investors tend to herd out of 
stocks that have previously exhibited over-optimistic sentiment, while Blasco et al., (2012) 
document the significant role of sentiment as an explanatory factor of herding using high-
frequency data for the Spanish market.  
 
2.2 Herding and mood during Ramadan 
Several studies  indicate that religion plays a significant role in the decisions of corporations 
and investors’ risk-taking behavior (Hilary & Hui, 2009; Białkowski et al., 2012). The 
Muslim holy month of Ramadan, in particular, has received notable attention. Celebrated by 
more than 1.5 billion Muslims across the world, Ramadan is a period during which Muslims 
abstain from eating, drinking, smoking or having other sensual pleasures from dawn till 
sunset. Clinical research finds that low levels of anxiety and increased levels of euphoria and 
social interactions are experienced during Ramadan (Daradkeh, 1992; Knerr & Pearl, 2008).  
To understand how Ramadan can promote herding tendencies among investors in 
majority Muslim countries, it is important to realize that it is a religious occasion that 
disciplines a person’s life in specific ways (e.g., by defining a fasting timetable/prayer times, 
abstinence from sensual pleasures) for a relatively prolonged period of time (several weeks).
9
 
The collective observation of Ramadan in these countries essentially suggests that its practice 
                                                          
8
 Investors may use these interactions to enhance their learning/understanding of equity investments (e.g., when 
discussing topics related to stock performance or stock-picking) and this can lead them to follow the choices of 
their fellow investors (e.g., an investor may choose to purchase stock A having recently heard that other 
investors trading that stock have realized profits from it).  
9
 The temporal identification of Ramadan each year is based on the Islamic (“Hegirian”) calendar which 
generates lunar years, incorporating 12 lunar months (each separated by a new moon and lasting 29 to 30 days) 
and lasts 354 days in total. The Ramadan-month is the ninth month in that calendar and because the lunar year is 
around 11 days shorter than the solar year (reflected through the Gregorian calendar), the location of Ramadan 
in the calendar falls around 11 days earlier from each successive solar year. For more, see Al-Khazali (2014).  
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is mutually reinforcing among their Muslim population, leading them to demonstrate certain 
similarities in their day-to-day conduct. The joyful character of the specific occasion breeds 
enhanced levels of euphoria and spiritual uplifting (Knerr & Pearl, 2008), which are further 
amplified via social interactions, which are of higher frequency during the Ramadan period 
(Białkowski et al., 2012). For those individual investors, the aforementioned psychological 
frame can lead to herding through the combination of two factors.  
First, it tends to render people less risk-averse, leading them to choose investment 
options they would otherwise decline (Wright & Bower, 1992; Nofsinger, 2002). Second, 
enhanced social interaction during Ramadan propagates such behaviour among investors. 
This is reinforced by the historically high returns during Ramadan, knowledge of which is 
likely to prompt investors to underestimate risk. As a result, Ramadan induces a state of 
interactively reinforced optimism and this can foment herding among investors, based on the 
definition of herding as imitative conduct following interactive observation of people’s 
actions (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003) and other research (Blasco et al, 2012) on the role of 
optimism in engineering herding in stock markets. Moreover, the common exposure of 
investors to this emotional state constitutes a factor inducing relative homogeneity of an 
emotional background in the market, suggesting that this herding is of spurious nature, in line 
with our earlier discussion on herding typology. Non-Ramadan days, in comparison, should 
be depicting lower herding levels, since this relatively homogeneous state of emotional 
elation in society is expected to diminish post-Ramadan. 
These mood-effects of Ramadan have motivated several studies in finance, testing 
whether the enhanced social mood is transferred into the investment realm. Among the first 
studies on the impact of Ramadan on stock markets is that by Seyyed et al. (2005). Their 
examination of stock market behavior in Saudi Arabia for the period 1985-2000 shows no 
evidence of any difference in mean returns between Ramadan and non-Ramadan days. 
10 
 
However, volatility in the Saudi Arabian stock market was lower during Ramadan. Using a 
sample of eight Middle Eastern countries for the period 1992-2007, Al-Hajieh et al. (2011) 
find positive abnormal returns during the month of Ramadan for the majority of countries 
examined. The authors attribute their findings to the positive investors’ mood during 
Ramadan which is further reinforced by the enhanced social interaction characterizing its 
occasion. Białkowski et al. (2012) find that in a majority of 14 Muslim countries, stock 
returns during the month of Ramadan were higher than in non-Ramadan days. They attribute 
their findings to Ramadan promoting feelings of social identity and solidarity, hence 
increasing the optimism of investors and influencing their investment decisions accordingly. 
Finally, Al-Khazali (2014), using a sample of 15 Muslim countries for various time periods, 
confirm the presence of higher returns during Ramadan. However, the effect dissipated 
following the outbreak of the recent financial crisis. 
Our empirical analysis aims to establish whether the positive mood documented during 
Ramadan translates into higher herding compared to non-Ramadan days, in view of the extant 
aforementioned evidence on the relationship between herding and social mood. In fact, the 
possibility of herding constituting an explanation underlying the Ramadan-effect has been put 
forward by Al-Khazali (2014) and Al-Hajieh et al. (2011). Although both studies argue that 
investors during Ramadan are exposed to common psychological stimuli which may lead to 
herding tendencies, no explicit tests are undertaken. We test the robustness of our findings 
against a series of domestic (market returns; market volume) or international (US market 
returns; US investors’ sentiment; global financial crisis) market conditions.10 To this end, we 
                                                          
10
 The sensitivity of herding to different market conditions has been widely documented. Holmes et al. (2013) 
show that institutional investors’ herding varies with market returns, market volatility and regulatory changes. 
Gavriilidis et al. (2013) show that, market conditions aside, the propensity of institutional investors to herd can 
also be affected by industry conditions. At the aggregate market level, Chang et al. (2000), Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) and Economou et al. (2011) produce evidence for the impact of different market states on the 
significance of herding. 
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employ a sample of seven Muslim dominated countries: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey. We address the following questions: 
a)  Does herding exist during the Ramadan-month? 
b)  Is herding higher during the Ramadan-month compared to non-Ramadan days? 
c) Does the relationship between herding and Ramadan vary with different domestic/ 
international market states and the recent global financial crisis? 
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1 Methodology 
Our empirical design is based on the notion of herding proposed by Christie & Huang (1995) 
and Chang et al. (2000), according to which, herding is reflected in a reduced securities’ 
return-dispersion during periods of market stress. Whereas Christie & Huang (1995) assumed 
the relationship between the cross sectional dispersion of stock returns and market returns to 
be linear,
11
 there exists ample evidence linking herding to nonlinear dynamics in capital 
markets.
12
 Chang et al. (2000) proposed a herding measure accounting for the possibility of 
nonlinearities in the relationship between the cross sectional dispersion of stock returns and 
market returns. It is their approach we follow here. More specifically, they use the following 
empirical specification: 
CSADt = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r
2
m,t + εt                                                                    (1) 
where CSAD is the cross sectional absolute deviation of returns calculated as: 



N
i
tmtit rr
n
CSAD
1
,,
1
 
                                                                                                              (2) 
                                                          
11
 Christie & Huang (1995) tested for herding by regressing the cross sectional returns’ dispersion over two 
dummies, one for extreme-up and one for extreme-down market returns (“extreme” being identified in their 
paper with various areas of the tails of the market returns’ distribution). Negative values of the dummies’ 
coefficients would signify the presence of herding, as they would suggest a reduction in the returns’ dispersion.  
12
 E.g., Lux (1995), Iori (2002) and Focardi et al. (2002).  
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where ri,t is the return on security i on day t, rm,t is the market-average on day t (calculated by 
averaging the returns of all securities for day t) and n is the total number of securities traded 
on day t. According to Chang et al. (2000), under rational asset pricing, the dispersion of the 
returns would be linearly and positively related to the absolute returns of the market, given 
the fact that stocks differ in their sensitivities to changes in market returns. In the case of 
extreme market conditions, i.e. periods with high absolute values of market returns, this 
would lead to increased values of CSAD. However, if herding is present during such periods, 
stock returns would be expected to follow the return of the market. In other words, this would 
lead to a reduction in the values of CSAD. As such, herding would imply a negative 
relationship between CSAD and absolute market returns. During extreme periods, this 
relationship might lose its linearity, hence the inclusion of the squared market return term on 
the right hand side of the equation which would be translated into a significantly negative 
value of the α2-coefficient (indicative of a reduced dispersion of returns in the presence of 
nonlinearities).  
To test whether herding is different during Ramadan-days as opposed to days outside 
Ramadan, we first construct a dummy variable (D) taking the value of one during Ramadan-
days and zero during non-Ramadan days and then identify Ramadan-days in each year 
following the procedure outlined in Al-Khazali (2014). We then employ the following 
specification for each market: 
CSADt = α0 + α1D|rm,t| + α2(1-D)|rm,t| + α3Dr
2
m,t + α4(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt                                  (3) 
Given the above discussion, significantly negative values for α3 (α4) would indicate the 
presence of significant herding during (outside) Ramadan-days.  
Having run equation (3) for each of our sample markets, we then assess whether our 
results are robust to changes in variables pertaining to domestic and international market 
conditions: 
13 
 
- Domestic market performance (i.e. whether herding exhibits differences between days of 
positive versus days of negative domestic market returns),
13
 proxied here through rm,t. In 
this case, we run the following set of equations for each market: 
CSADt = α0 + α1
UP
D|rm,t| + α2
UP
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
UP
Dr
2
m,t + α4
UP
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt                             (4) 
CSADt = α0 + α1
DOWN
D|rm,t| + α2
DOWN
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
DOWN
Dr
2
m,t + α4
DOWN
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt          (5) 
where the superscript UP (DOWN) denotes that the model is estimated for days of 
positive (negative) domestic market returns.  
- Domestic market volume (i.e. whether herding differs between days of increased versus 
days of decreased domestic market volume),
14
 which we calculate daily by aggregating 
the volumes of all listed stocks in that market every day. In this case, we run the 
following set of equations for each market: 
CSADt = α0 + α1
UPVol
D|rm,t| + α2
UPVol
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
UPVol
Dr
2
m,t + α4
UPVol
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt           (6) 
CSADt = α0 + α1
DOWNVol
D|rm,t| + α2
DOWNVol
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
DOWNVol
Dr
2
m,t + α4
DOWNVol
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt            (7) 
where the superscript UPVol (DOWNVol) denotes that the model is estimated for days 
of increasing (decreasing) domestic market volume. 
- US market performance (i.e. whether our herding estimates are different when the US 
market exhibits positive versus negative returns),
15
 proxied here through the daily returns 
of the S&P500 index. In this case, we run the following set of equations for each market: 
CSADt = α0 + α1
UPUS
D|rm,t| + α2
UPUS
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
UPUS
Dr
2
m,t + α4
UPUS
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt                 (8) 
                                                          
13
 The effect of market performance upon herding has been demonstrated by a wealth of studies, including 
Chang et al. (2000), Chiang et al. (2010), Tan et al. (2008) and Economou et al. (2011). Down-markets tend to 
be conducive to herding, as they can lead investors to mimic their peers due to professional reasons (the case 
e.g. of “bad” fund managers copying the trades of their “good” peers; upon their performance assessment, “bad” 
managers in this case can always claim that they engaged in the right trades – those they copied from the “good” 
managers - and blame their poor performance on adverse market conditions) or risk-aversion (the choice of 
selling with the crowd early on to avoid selling at worse prices at a later stage should a slump persist). Up-
markets can also breed herding due to the generalized euphoria accompanying them. For more on how market 
returns can affect herding, see Holmes et al. (2013) and Gavriilidis et al. (2013). 
14
 The effect of volume over herding has been denoted by several studies, including Tan et al. (2008) and 
Economou et al. (2011). High volume can boost herding in a market since it allows the entry of informed 
investors (whom uninformed traders can imitate) and reduces frictions due to thin trading (thus, rendering 
herding possible). For more discussion, see Gavriilidis et al. (2013). 
15
 The role of the US market in investors’ herding internationally has been depicted in Chiang & Zheng (2010). 
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CSADt = α0 + α1
DOWNUSD|rm,t| + α2
DOWNUS(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
DOWNUSDr2m,t + α4
DOWNUS(1-D)r2m,t + εt   (9) 
where the superscript UPUS (DOWNUS) denotes that the model is estimated for days of 
positive (negative) US market returns. 
- US investors’ sentiment (i.e. whether herding differs between days of improving versus 
days of deteriorating US investors’ sentiment), proxied here through the CBOE VIX 
index.
16
 In this case, we run the following set of equations for each market: 
CSADt = α0 + α1
UPVIX
D|rm,t| + α2
UPVIX
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
UPVIX
Dr
2
m,t + α4
UPVIX
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt                       (10) 
CSADt = α0 + α1
DOWNVIX
D|rm,t| + α2
DOWNVIX
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
DOWNVIX
Dr
2
m,t + α4
DOWNVIX
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt    (11) 
where the superscript UPVIX (DOWNVIX) denotes that the model is estimated for days 
of increasing/decreasing VIX-values. 
Finally, we test whether controlling for the global financial crisis affects our results by re-
running equation (3) prior to and after the outbreak of the global financial crisis (i.e., 
September 2008).
17
 In this case, we run the following set of equations for each market: 
CSADt = α0 + α1
PREOUTBREAK
D|rm,t| + α2
PREOUTBREAK
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
PREOUTBREAK
Dr
2
m,t + α4
PREOUTBREAK
(1-
D)r
2
m,t + εt                                                                                                                                                                                                                             (12)
 
CSADt = α0 + α1
POSTOUTBREAK
D|rm,t| + α2
POSTOUTBREAK
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
POSTOUTBREAK
Dr
2
m,t + 
α4
POSTOUTBREAK
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt                                                                                                                                                                               (13) 
where the superscript PREOUTBREAK (POSTOUTBREAK) denotes that the model is 
estimated prior to (after) the crisis’ outbreak. 
 
3.2 Data 
Our data contain daily observations of the closing prices and trading volume from all 
ordinary stocks listed on the equity markets of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
                                                          
16
 The role of US investors’ sentiment in global markets has been denoted by Verma & Soydemir (2006). The 
CBOE VIX was introduced in 1993 and is an implied volatility index calculated based on S&P500 options. 
According to Whaley (2000), the CBOE VIX is considered to gauge investors’ fear. As such, higher levels of 
VIX would indicate higher uncertainty in the market. The relationship of the CBOE VIX and herding has been 
widely documented in the herding literature (Chiang et al., 2013; Philippas et al., 2013).   
17
 For more on the 2008 financial crisis see Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010).  
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Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey. All seven markets operate in majority Muslim countries for 
which data is available since the early 1990s. This allows us a time-window long enough to 
test for the relationship between herding and Ramadan. The start date of data for each market 
can, therefore, be traced in the 1990-1994 period, while the end-date is 28/2/2014 (see Table 
1 for more details). To mitigate the possibility of survivorship bias affecting our results, our 
sample includes both active as well as dead/suspended stocks (for the period these were 
traded). In total, the number of stocks respectively is 366 for Bangladesh, 710 for Egypt, 588 
for Indonesia, 1,296 for Malaysia, 108 for Morocco, 506 for Pakistan and 476 for Turkey. We 
also use data on the daily time series of the S&P500 index and the CBOE VIX index. All data 
employed in this study were obtained from the Thomson-Reuters DataStream database.  
Panel A in Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the cross sectional absolute 
deviations (CSAD) of returns for all seven markets. Morocco’s CSAD has the smallest mean 
value (0.0099), while Turkey’s bears the highest (0.0235), followed by Indonesia (0.0224) 
and Pakistan (0.0207). Panel B presents the average daily trading volume for all seven 
markets. Seyyed et al. (2005) show that the trading volume in Saudi Arabia decreases during 
Ramadan. However, Al-Hajieh et al. (2011), using a sample of eight Muslim countries, finds 
no consistent impact of Ramadan on trading volumes. In some years, these appear increasing 
and in other years decreasing. For our sample, the trading volumes in six out of the seven 
sample countries decrease during Ramadan days (with the difference being significant at the 
5% level in all cases but Morocco, where the difference is significant at the 10% level). For 
Turkey, the trading volume is higher during Ramadan, although the difference is 
insignificant.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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4. Results-Discussion 
4.1 Empirical findings 
We begin our discussion with the results from equation (3). Using Newey-West consistent 
estimators, we first run a pooled OLS regression to present an overall picture of the impact of 
Ramadan on herding.
18
 The results presented in Table 2 (Panel A) reveal that, overall, 
herding is present during the Ramadan-month and stronger during Ramadan days (α3 is 
negative and statistically significant and significantly higher than α4, in absolute terms). We 
split the sample to gauge whether the results in the first column are robust when conditioning 
herding upon a variety of market states pertaining to each of our sample markets individually 
and the US. We address the third research question by running equations 4 to 13and we find 
the following. Herding is present only within the Ramadan period during domestic down-
market days, domestic down-volume days, US up-market days and during the pre-crisis 
period. Where herding is present both in Ramadan and non-Ramadan days, this appears 
stronger on Ramadan days during domestic up-market days, domestic up-volume days and 
US down-market days (with the difference being significant in all tests except during up-
market days). Herding is only present or appears stronger within non-Ramadan days during 
up-VIX days and during the post-crisis period. 
We employ a country fixed-effect panel approach to account for time-invariant 
heterogeneity across our sample countries (Panel B). Our findings confirm the hypothesis that 
herding tendencies are amplified during Ramadan (with the difference being highly 
significant). In addition, herding is only present within the Ramadan period during domestic 
down-market days, domestic down-volume days, US up-market days and during the pre-
crisis period. When herding appears during both periods, this appears stronger on Ramadan 
days during up-market days and up-volume days (with the difference being significant). 
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 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach. 
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Finally, herding is only present or appears stronger within non-Ramadan days during up-VIX 
days and the post crisis period.  Overall, in respect of our first two research questions, the 
evidence suggests that the common mood effects associated with Ramadan are associated 
with strong herding tendencies during Ramadan-days.
19
 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We now present the results from equation (3) at a country level. The results reported in Table 
3 indicate the presence of herding within Ramadan (reflected through significantly negative 
α3 values) in Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco and Turkey. In Egypt, Indonesia and 
Turkey, herding is also significant outside Ramadan days (α4 is significantly negative for 
them). For these three markets, we observe that in absolute terms α3 is  always larger than α4, 
which suggests that herding in these markets is stronger within-Ramadan, although the 
difference between the estimates of α3 and α4 is significant for Turkey only. The markets in 
Malaysia and Pakistan exhibit significant herding only outside  Ramadan days.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 4 presents the estimates from equations (4) and (5) where we control for the 
impact of the domestic market’s returns over the relationship between herding and Ramadan 
at a country level. The results are in line with those outlined in the previous table. Significant 
herding is detected within Ramadan in Bangladesh (during down-market days), Indonesia, 
Morocco and Turkey (during both up- and down-market days), while no herding is detected 
in Egypt within Ramadan. With the exception of Morocco, herding is significant outside 
Ramadan days in the rest of the markets, either only during up-market (Indonesia and 
                                                          
19
 The country variations in herd behaviour could be due to the differences in the level of religiosity among the 
sample countries. To test for this hypothesis, we rerun our regressions by adding a control variable for the ratio 
of Muslim population to total population. The fraction of Muslim population has been obtained from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (2013), as in Biakowski et al (2012). These unreported results are 
quantitatively similar and are available upon request. We thank the guest editors for this comment. 
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Turkey) or down-market (Bangladesh) days or during both (Egypt, Malaysia and Pakistan). 
For those tests where herding is significant both within and outside Ramadan days 
(Bangladesh for down-market days; Indonesia and Turkey for up-market days), herding 
appears stronger within Ramadan (the value in absolute terms of α3 is always larger than that 
of α4), with the difference between the estimates of α3 and α4 being significant for Indonesia 
only.  
Overall, the significance of herding in Ramadan is not affected by market performance in 
Indonesia, Morocco and Turkey, while it manifests itself only during down-market days in 
Bangladesh. An interesting observation in this respect is that for those markets (Indonesia, 
Morocco and Turkey) where herding is detected within Ramadan during both up- and down-
market days, the values of α3 are larger in absolute terms during up- compared to down-
market days. This suggests that, although herding during Ramadan is present irrespective of 
the market’s performance, it appears stronger during days of positive market performance 
within Ramadan. A possible explanation for this is that herding during a period of overall 
positive mood like Ramadan’s appears the strongest during days when the market is 
reflective of this mood (i.e., up-market days). These results indicate a link between herding 
and overall positive market returns during Ramadan and are largely in line with prior 
evidence (Al-Hajieh et al., 2011; Białkowski et al., 2012; Al-Khazali, 2014) indirectly 
attributing Ramadan’s highly positive returns to commonalities in investors’ positive mood 
during Ramadan in majority Muslim countries.
20
      
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 5 presents the results from equations (6) and (7), where herding is conditioned upon the 
domestic market’s volume rising or falling day-to-day. Significant herding is reported within-
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 It is noted here that Indonesia, Morocco and Turkey are the three markets in our sample with the highest 
average in-Ramadan market returns (6.1%, 10.1% and 4.7%, respectively).  
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Ramadan during both increasing and decreasing volume days for Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Morocco and Turkey. Bangladesh and Indonesia indicate significant herding outside 
Ramadan days during increasing volume days, Turkey during decreasing volume days, while 
no evidence of significant herding is presented for Morocco outside Ramadan. Where herding 
is significant both within and outside Ramadan days (Bangladesh and Indonesia for 
increasing volume days; Turkey for decreasing volume days), herding appears stronger 
within Ramadan (α3 in absolute terms is always greater in value than α4), with the difference 
between α3 and α4 being significant in all cases. For the remaining three markets are 
concerned, herding is only significant during non Ramadan days: both for increasing and 
decreasing volume days in Egypt and Pakistan and increasing volume days in Malaysia.
21
 In 
three of the four markets where herding in Ramadan is present during both increasing and 
decreasing volume days (Bangladesh, Indonesia and Morocco, with the exception of Turkey), 
the absolute values of α3 are larger during increasing compared to decreasing volume days. 
This suggests that, although herding is present during the Ramadan period irrespective of 
trading volumes, it appears stronger during days of increasing market volume within 
Ramadan. A possibility here is that herding grows stronger in Ramadan during days with 
increased market volume, as the latter helps reduce frictions in trading, thus rendering 
herding feasible, by allowing those willing to herd the opportunity to do so (Gavriilidis et al., 
2013).    
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Conditioning herding estimations upon the daily movements of the US market (indicated by 
the S&P500 index), we report evidence of herding within Ramadan for almost all markets 
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 In line with Economou et al. (2011), we have repeated these tests controlling for the effect of domestic market 
volume using the 30-day moving average of volume (i.e., whether volume is greater than or less than its 30-day 
moving average). The results of these tests are very similar to those reported here and are available upon 
request.  
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(bar Pakistan, where herding is significant outside Ramadan days only). Table 6 shows this to 
be the case during up- and down-market days for Bangladesh, Morocco and Turkey, down-
market days for Egypt and Malaysia and up-market days for Indonesia.
22
 With the exception 
of Morocco, the remaining markets exhibit widespread evidence of herding during non-
Ramadan days as well. This is the case during up- and down-market days for Egypt and 
Malaysia, up-market days for Turkey and down-market days for Bangladesh and Indonesia. 
For tests where herding is significant both within and outside Ramadan days (down-market 
days for Bangladesh, Egypt and Malaysia; up-market days for Turkey), the absolute value of 
α3 is always larger than that of α4. For those cases, herding is more intense within Ramadan, 
with the difference between the estimates of α3 and α4 being significant in all cases. For those 
markets where herding is significant during both up- and down-markets in Ramadan, our 
evidence on the relationship between herding and US market returns in Ramadan is mixed, 
with absolute values of α3 being larger during down- (up-) market days in Bangladesh and 
Morocco (Turkey). 
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 7 presents the results from equations (10) and (11) where we condition herding upon 
daily changes of the US investors’ sentiment index (VIX). Significant herding exists within 
Ramadan during increasing and decreasing days for the VIX in Indonesia, Morocco and 
Turkey and increasing VIX-days only in Bangladesh, Egypt and Malaysia. For Pakistan, 
there is significant herding only outside Ramadan days. Herding outside Ramadan is 
indicated during increasing VIX-days in Bangladesh and Indonesia, decreasing VIX-days in 
Turkey and increasing/decreasing VIX-days in Egypt and Malaysia. Any test for which 
herding is significant both within Ramadan and outside Ramadan days entails  absolute 
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 The up-/down-market days mentioned here refer to the US market and should not be confused with the up-
/down-market days when we discuss the results in Table 4 (which referred to each of our sample markets).  
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values of α3 exceeding in absolute terms the corresponding α4 values, with the difference 
being significant in all tests. These results confirm the stronger presence of herding during 
Ramadan days.  
From the estimates presented in Table 7, herding in Ramadan is significant during up-
VIX days (six markets) compared to down-VIX ones (three markets). This is confirmed when 
looking at those markets for which herding in Ramadan is significant during both up- and 
down-VIX days (Indonesia; Morocco; Turkey). The absolute α3-values for Indonesia and 
Morocco are larger during up- compared to down-VIX days (indicating that herding in these 
two markets is stronger in Ramadan during days when the VIX has appreciated in value), 
with the reverse being the case for Turkey. Given that an increase in VIX is associated with a 
rise in “fear” among investors in the US (it predicts higher volatility during the next 30 days), 
our findings indicate that herding in Ramadan in our sample markets is related to rising VIX-
values. The latter is reported for the first time in the literature and is in line with extant 
research (Chiang et al., 2013; Philippas et al., 2013) demonstrating the role of increasing VIX 
values in motivating herding internationally.       
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In order to control for the effect of the global financial crisis that began in September 2008, 
we estimate equations (12) and (13) and present the corresponding results in Table 8. 
Significant herding within Ramadan is indicated in Bangladesh and Indonesia both pre and 
post- 2008 and in Morocco and Turkey pre- 2008. In these markets, herding is significant 
during non Ramadan days pre and post- 2008 in Indonesia and Turkey and post-2008 in 
Bangladesh. The other three markets (Egypt, Malaysia and Pakistan) show evidence of 
herding significance only outside Ramadan days, irrespective of period. Where herding is 
significant within and outside Ramadan, the absolute values of α3 are larger  than those of α4 
22 
 
(with the difference being statistically significant in Indonesia post-2008 and Turkey pre-
2008), confirming that herding is more pronounced during Ramadan days.  
The outbreak of the 2008 crisis affected investment patterns generally across world 
markets. It is possible that this has affected the propensity of investors in majority Muslim 
countries to herd during Ramadan. The reduction of the Ramadan effect in herding post-2008  
is interesting, more so in view of evidence from Al-Khazali (2014) showing that the 
Ramadan effect in stock returns also scaled back substantially in majority Muslim markets 
after 2008.
23
   
 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2 Discussion - contributions 
The results outlined in Tables 2-8 generally demonstrate that herding is present during 
Ramadan. In most of our sample markets, herding appears significantly stronger within rather 
than outside Ramadan (for most cases whereby it is significant on both Ramadan and non 
Ramadan days). These findings are reported for the first time in the literature. Thus, we 
contribute to the herding as well as Islamic finance literature in the following ways.  
Unlike most studies that examine Ramadan from a market efficiency viewpoint (i.e. as a 
seasonal anomaly; see the review by Al-Khazali, 2014) our work takes a behavioral 
perspective, thereby addressing a literature gap in the wider debate over the role of religion in 
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 To account for the possibility that the time-difference between the sample countries and the US affects our 
estimates from the tests controlling for US variables (S&P500/VIX), we repeated all tests controlling for these 
variables, this time conditioning herding upon their lagged values. Results overall confirm the patterns reported 
in Tables 6 and 7. We also tested for the possibility of the size-effect in our findings by performing all tests 
using value-weighted CSADs; results from these tests confirmed overall the findings presented in Tables 2-8. 
Finally, in order to test for the impact of the political instability in Egypt in 2011, we rerun the regressions from 
equations (3) to (9) for the Egyptian market (we thank the guest editors for this comment). These are 
qualitatively similar to those reported here. Results for all the above tests are not reported here in the interest of 
brevity and are available upon request.   
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investors’ behavior.24  To the extent that Ramadan is associated with specific behavioral 
facets - in particular enhanced social interactions and optimism (Białkowski et al., 2012) - our 
results are in line with research on the role of social interactions (Hong et al., 2004; Hong et 
al., 2005) and positive sentiment (Liao et al., 2011) over the propensity to herd. Given that 
this research has been undertaken mainly within a micro context (i.e., based on data from 
individual – retail as well as institutional - market participants’ trades and accounts), the 
evidence presented in this study offers new insight on these issues from an aggregate market 
perspective.
25
 By showing the relationship between herding and a sentiment-related occasion 
like Ramadan, our study demonstrates that Ramadan should be considered as a sentiment-
proxy when researching herding (as well as other sentiment-related behavioral phenomena, 
such as feedback trading and momentum) in majority Muslim markets.  
Herding significance within/outside Ramadan exhibits some variation in its robustness 
across markets to different market states, whether domestic (market returns; market volume) 
or international (US market returns; US investors’ sentiment; global financial crisis). The 
significance of herding within Ramadan appears more consistent in Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Morocco and Turkey compared to Egypt.
26
 Herding outside Ramadan is consistently 
significant in some markets (Egypt; Malaysia; Pakistan) and less so in others (Indonesia; 
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 The effect of Ramadan over investors’ behavior has been rather scantly investigated to date. A study relevant 
to this issue is the one by Białkowski et al. (2013) which links mutual funds’ performance in Turkey with the 
Ramadan-effect.  
25
 Our study is based on aggregate market data (i.e. equity prices), whereas the studies mentioned here assess 
investors’ behavior using transaction data.  
26
 We refer specifically to those five markets, because they are the ones with significant herding within-
Ramadan in the unconditional herding test of equation (3). There are very few exceptions to the observed 
herding significance within-Ramadan in Bangladesh (domestic up-market days; down-VIX days), Indonesia 
(US up-market days), Morocco (post-crisis’ outbreak) and Turkey (post-crisis’ outbreak); conversely, the 
significance of herding within-Ramadan in Egypt is only observed during US down-market days and up-VIX 
days.  
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Turkey).
27
 This highlights the versatility of the relationship between herding and Ramadan, 
while lending support to research  showcasing the sensitivity of herding to market conditions 
(Chang et al., 2000; Chiang & Zheng, 2010; Holmes et al., 2013). Given their emerging 
market status, the fact that all seven markets exhibit widespread evidence of herding (within 
and/or outside Ramadan) is in line with findings (e.g. Chang et al., 2000) that market 
participants are more susceptible to herding in emerging stock exchanges.  
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper examines the relationship between herding and Ramadan motivated by 
emotional/behavioral expressions (enhanced social interactions; optimism) which have been 
observed to facilitate herding and particularly during Ramadan. Drawing on a sample of 
seven stock markets from majority Muslim countries, we document the presence of 
significant herding during Ramadan in most of our sample markets. We also show that 
herding appears significantly stronger within Ramadan for most tests where it is significant 
on both Ramadan and non Ramadan days. Overall, herding significance within/outside 
Ramadan exhibits some variation in its robustness across markets to variables reflective of 
domestic (market returns; market volume) or international (US market returns; US investors’ 
sentiment; global financial crisis) market states.  
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 We refer specifically to those five markets, because they are the ones with significant herding outside-
Ramadan in the unconditional herding test of equation (3). Herding outside-Ramadan is insignificant only 
during decreasing domestic volume days in Malaysia; conversely, the significance of herding outside-Ramadan 
is not observed on several occasions in Indonesia (domestic down-market days; decreasing domestic volume 
days; US up-market days; down-VIX days) and Turkey (domestic down-market days; increasing domestic 
volume days; US down-market days; up-VIX days). It is perhaps worth noting that the two markets (Malaysia 
and Pakistan) for which no evidence of herding was identified during Ramadan are those whose in-Ramadan 
average market returns are lower compared to outside-Ramadan average market returns; the rm,t of the Chang et 
al. (2000) model was used as a proxy of average market returns. The in- (outside-) Ramadan average market 
returns are as follows: Bangladesh: 4.2% (3.2%); Egypt: 4.6% (1.9%); Indonesia: 6.1% (5.6%); Malaysia: -2.3% 
(0.3%); Morocco: 10.1% (4.2%); Pakistan: 4.5% (4.7%); Turkey: 4.7% (2%). Given the extant evidence 
mentioned earlier in this study of Ramadan being linked to highly positive returns compared to the rest of the 
year’s days in majority Muslim countries, it is possible that the absence of herding in-Ramadan for these two 
countries may be the result of them bearing lower average returns in-Ramadan compared to non-Ramadan days.   
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Our work produces original contributions on the impact of religion in financial decisions, 
by demonstrating that a religious occasion (Ramadan) is a determinant of herding 
significance. Previous research has only indirectly made inferences about the impact of 
Ramadan on investor behavior (by examining Ramadan as a seasonal anomaly). To the extent 
that social interactions and positive sentiment constitute Ramadan’s two key behavioral 
features, our results confirm at the aggregate market level prior evidence from micro-level 
research on the effect of these two features upon herding. The role of Ramadan, as a 
sentiment-related occasion in motivating herding suggests that Ramadan constitutes a 
sentiment-proxy worth considering when researching herding  in majority Muslim markets. 
This also contributes to the wider herding debate and the impact of social norms on markets 
by laying the ground for further research into whether major religious occasions (e.g., 
Catholic or Orthodox Easter week) can affect herding behavior. From the perspective of 
practitioners, our study contains implications for the investment community, in particular for 
traders with exposure to equity markets in majority Muslim countries.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for CSAD and trading volume across all sample 
markets. 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for CSAD 
 
Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Malaysia Morocco Pakistan Turkey 
Start-date 2/1/1992 19/10/1994 3/1/1990 1/1/1990 2/7/1993 2/1/1991 3/1/1990 
End-date 28/2/2014 28/2/2014 28/2/2014 28/2/2014 28/2/2014 28/2/2014 28/2/2014 
Mean  0,0171 0,0162 0,0224 0,0184 0,0099 0,0207 0,0235 
Median  0,0155 0,0157 0,0204 0,018 0,0098 0,0204 0,0203 
Maximum  0,6863 0,1331 0,6405 0,2577 0,1026 0,1758 0,2892 
Minimum  0,00002 0,000055 0,000026 0,000001 0,00013 0,000016 0,000002 
Standard 
deviation  
0,0136 0,008 0,0168 0,0094 0,0062 0,0099 0,0124 
Number of  
observations 
4782 4378 6088 6181 4985 5297 6010 
Panel B. Average trading volume during non-Ramadan and Ramadan days. 
 
Non-
Ramadan Ramadan Test of Difference 
   
Bangladesh 53731,2 39786,0 
4.67 
(0.0000) 
   
Egypt 64681,0 47797,5 
5.57 
(0.0000) 
   
Indonesia 1851698,2 1602752,4 
2.94 
(0.0033) 
   
Malaysia 88609,5 80769,4 
2.65 
(0.0000) 
   
Morocco 2016,5 879,1 
1.84 
(0.0654) 
   
Pakistan 457782,6 357245,7 
4.66 
(0.0000) 
   
Turkey 532803,4 558150,8 
-1.24 
(0.2141) 
   CSAD stands for cross sectional absolute deviation of returns. See section 3 for details on the method and sample 
selection. Trading volume is expressed in thousands of stocks. 
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Table 2: Pooled OLS estimation and fixed effect panel estimation. 
Panel A. Pooled OLS estimation     
 
Overall Up-market Down-market Up-volume Down-volume Up-S&P500 Down-S&P500 Up-Vix Down-Vix Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
α0 
0.0141 
(0.0000) 
0.0150 
(0.0000) 
0.0150 
(0.0000) 
0.0144 
(0.0000) 
0.0142 
(0.0000) 
0.0141 
(0.0000) 
0.0139 
(0.0000) 
0.0139 
(0.0000) 
0.0143 
(0.0000) 
0.0132 
(0.0000) 
0.0137 
(0.0000) 
α1 
0.4230 
(0.0000) 
0.3963 
(0.0000) 
0.3993 
(0.0000) 
0.3271 
(0.0000) 
0.4834 
(0.0000) 
0.4629 
(0.0000) 
0.5263 
(0.0000) 
0.3203 
(0.0000) 
0.3800 
(0.0000) 
0.2272 
(0.0000) 
0.4312 
(0.0000) 
α2 
0.4058 
(0.0000) 
0.4017 
(0.0000) 
0.2897 
(0.0000) 
0.3888 
(0.0000) 
0.4137 
(0.0000) 
0.3917 
(0.0000) 
0.4640 
(0.0000) 
0.4612 
(0.0000) 
0.3887 
(0.0000) 
0.2842 
(0.0000) 
0.5938 
(0.0000) 
α3 
-0.3117 
(0.0000) 
-0.2947 
(0.0000) 
-0.2924 
(0.0000) 
-0.6282 
(0.0000) 
-0.3536 
(0.0000) 
-0.3381 
(0.0000) 
-0.2604 
(0.0000) 
-0.2403 
(0.0000) 
0.6556 
(0.0000) 
-0.1714 
(0.0000) 
0.2101 
(0.0000) 
α4 
-0.1177 
(0.0000) 
-0.2909 
(0.0000) 
0.8732 
(0.0000) 
-0.2454 
(0.0000) 
0.8182 
(0.0000) 
0.0313 
(0.0547) 
-0.0622 
(0.0000) 
-0.6694 
(0.0000) 
0.2057 
(0.0000) 
0.1348 
(0.0000) 
-0.1983 
(0.0075) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
2.62 
(0.1057) 
0.14 
(0.7131) 
56.31 
(0.0000) 
20.93 
(0.0000) 
22.92 
(0.0000) 
23.09 
(0.0000) 
6.68 
(0.0098) 
92.68 
(0.0000) 
0.20 
(0.6516) 
4.85 
(0.0277) 
13.02 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
16.67  
(0.0000) 
0.04 
(0.8358) 
16.60 
(0.0000) 
45.84 
(0.0000) 
28.73 
(0.0000) 
35.75 
(0.0000) 
63.77 
(0.0000) 
37.15 
(0.0000) 
23.04 
(0.0000) 
14.53 
(0.0000) 
57.68 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.2684 0.2335 0.3532 0.2307 0.4783 0.2932 0.2672 0.2641 0.3323 0.2652 0.3223 
Panel B. Fixed effect panel estimation     
 
Overall Up-market Down-market Up-volume Down-volume Up-S&P500 Down-S&P500 Up-Vix Down-Vix Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
α0 0.0182 
(0.0000) 
0.0188 
(0.0000) 
0.0195 
(0.0000) 
0.0189 
(0.0000) 
0.0179 
(0.0000) 
0.0183 
(0.0000) 
0.0177 
(0.0000) 
0.0181 
(0.0000) 
0.0180 
(0.0000) 
0.0188 
(0.0000) 
0.0174 
(0.0000) 
α1 0.3848 
(0.0000) 
0.3530 
(0.0000) 
0.3600 
(0.0000) 
0.2780 
(0.0000) 
0.4511 
(0.0000) 
0.4292 
(0.0000) 
0.4597 
(0.0000) 
0.2778 
(0.0000) 
0.3297 
(0.0000) 
0.3205 
(0.0000) 
0.3249 
(0.0000) 
α2 0.3602 
(0.0000) 
0.3497 
(0.0000) 
0.2409 
(0.0000) 
0.3372 
(0.0000) 
0.3713 
(0.0000) 
0.3465 
(0.0000) 
0.4178 
(0.0000) 
0.4134 
(0.0000) 
0.3447 
(0.0000) 
0.3651 
(0.0000) 
0.4685 
(0.0000) 
α3 -0.2858 
(0.0000) 
-0.2651 
(0.0000) 
-0.2659 
(0.0000) 
-0.5430 
(0.0000) 
-0.3321 
(0.0000) 
-0.3153 
(0.0000) 
-0.2276 
(0.0000) 
-0.2116 
(0.0000) 
0.8011 
(0.0000) 
-0.2418 
(0.0000) 
0.5571 
(0.0000) 
α4 -0.0413 
(0.0000) 
-0.2078 
(0.0000) 
0.9682 
(0.0000) 
-0.2119 
(0.0000) 
0.8902 
(0.0000) 
0.1039 
(0.0000) 
-0.0536 
(0.0000) 
-0.5853 
(0.0000) 
0.2760 
(0.0000) 
0.0001 
(0.0000) 
-0.1415 
(0.0000) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
5.90 
(0.0151) 
0.06 
(0.8093) 
75.21 
(0.0000) 
22.10 
(0.0000) 
33.87 
(0.0000) 
34.16 
(0.0000) 
3.40 
(0.0653) 
96.46 
(0.0000) 
0.66 
(0.4148) 
3.69 
(0.0500) 
12.41 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
29.12 
(0.0000) 
11.14 
(0.0008) 
20.92 
(0.0000) 
39.19 
(0.0000) 
35.13 
(0.0000) 
50.24 
(0.0000) 
54.97 
(0.0000) 
31.49 
(0.0000) 
34.51 
(0.0000) 
10.27 
(0.0000) 
60.96 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.3385 0.3207 0.4287 0.3310 0.5384 0.3564 0.3454 0.3457 0.3934 0.2850 0.4271 
Notes: Panel A assumes an equal intercept across countries. The regressions in panel B include country-specific fixed effects. For the sake of brevity fixed effects are not reported in the table. The 
regressions are based on an unbalanced panel while the length of the series for each country is determined by data availability in Table 1. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Estimates of herding for the full sample period (equation 3). 
 Bangladesh  Egypt  Indonesia  Malaysia  Morocco  Pakistan  Turkey  
α0
 
0.0139 
(0.0000) 
0.0137 
(0.0000) 
0.0162 
(0.0000) 
0.0144 
(0.0000) 
0.0067 
(0.0000) 
0.0169 
(0.0000) 
0.0157 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.3135 
(0.0000) 
0.2290 
(0.0001) 
0.3837 
(0.0000) 
0.3227 
(0.0000) 
0.8849 
(0.0000) 
0.0115 
(0.8621) 
0.7195 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.2385 
(0.0000) 
0.2582 
(0.0000) 
0.5609 
(0.0000) 
0.4065 
(0.0000) 
0.7023 
(0.0000) 
0.3639 
(0.0000) 
0.5525 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.1661 
(0.0002) 
-0.9468 
(0.0030) 
-0.2861 
(0.0000) 
0.8804 
(0.0000) 
-0.1573 
(0.0000) 
0.9343 
(0.0000) 
-0.3772 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
0.2282 
(0.0000) 
-0.8842 
(0.0000) 
-0.2064 
(0.0000) 
-0.1658 
(0.0000) 
0.6005 
(0.0000) 
-0.1054 
(0.0000) 
-0.0706 
(0.0000) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-1.5154 
(0.1297) 
0.4955 
(0.6203) 
4.7643 
(0.0000) 
3.7653 
(0.0002) 
-2.7226 
(0.0065) 
5.4025 
(0.0000) 
-5.6539 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
4.2160 
(0.0000) 
0.0409 
(0.9674) 
-0.5247 
(0.5998) 
-19.6039 
(0.0000) 
7.0896 
(0.0000) 
-5.6246 
(0.0000) 
10.4797 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.2688 0.0992 0.3075 0.3545 0.4823 0.1650 0.4179 
Notes: The table presents the estimates from the following equation:  
CSADt = α0 + α1D|rm,t| + α2(1-D)|rm,t| + α3Dr
2
m,t + α4(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt 
 
CSAD refers to the cross sectional absolute deviation of returns for each market. The equation is estimated using Newey-
West consistent estimators. D is a dummy assuming the value of one for the days falling within Ramadan each year, zero 
otherwise. P-values are reported in parentheses; the difference in significance between the within- versus outside-Ramadan 
values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics. rm,t refers to the each market’s average return.  
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Table 4: Estimates of herding for up versus down domestic market days (equations 4 and 5). 
Panel A: herding estimates for up domestic market days (equation 4) 
 Bangladesh  Egypt  Indonesia  Malaysia  Morocco  Pakistan  Turkey  
α0
 
0.0144 
(0.0000) 
0.0135 
(0.0000) 
0.0158 
(0.0000) 
0.0143 
(0.0000) 
0.0062 
(0.0000) 
0.0159 
(0.0000) 
0.0134 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.3503 
(0.0005) 
0.2733 
(0.0112) 
0.4115 
(0.0000) 
0.2334 
(0.0000) 
0.9427 
(0.0000) 
0.1239 
(0.1583) 
0.8526 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.2597 
(0.0000) 
0.2719 
(0.0000) 
0.5946 
(0.0000) 
0.4573 
(0.0000) 
0.7304 
(0.0000) 
0.4787 
(0.0000) 
0.8475 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.1880 
(0.2527) 
-0.0997 
(0.9815) 
-0. 8760 
(0.0000) 
0.2158 
(0.0000) 
-0.1776 
(0.0002) 
0.6870 
(0.0064) 
-0. 4828 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
0.2006 
(0.0000) 
-0.8877 
(0.0000) 
-0.3061  
(0.0000) 
-0.2131 
(0.0000) 
0.6248 
(0.0000) 
-0.1355 
(0.0000) 
-0.4515  
(0.0000) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-0.9114 
(0.3621) 
-0.0134 
(0.9893) 
4.0766 
(0.0000) 
5.1894 
(0.0000) 
-2.3416 
(0.0193) 
4.1306 
(0.0000) 
-0.1418 
(0.8872) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
1.2683 
(0.2048) 
-0.1836 
(0.8543) 
-13.2137 
(0.0000) 
-13.3006 
(0.0000) 
5.0675 
(0.0000) 
-3.2798 
(0.0010) 
-0.8688 
(0.3850) 
R
2
 0.3046 0.1013 0.2826 0.3157 0.4998 0.2196 0.4724 
Panel B: herding estimates for down domestic market days (equation 5) 
α0
 
0.0124 
(0.0000) 
0.0137 
(0.0000) 
0.0176 
(0.0000) 
0.0148 
(0.0000) 
0.0073 
(0.0000) 
0.0180 
(0.0000) 
0.0175 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.3162 
(0.0000) 
0.1534 
(0.0842) 
0.3334 
(0.0000) 
0.2335 
(0.0000) 
0.8513 
(0.0000) 
-0.1106 
(0.2711) 
0.5573 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.3537 
(0.0000) 
0.2948 
(0.0000) 
0.4243 
(0.0000) 
0.3188 
(0.0000) 
0.6862 
(0.0000) 
0.2489 
(0.0000) 
0.3687 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0. 1909 
(0.0000) 
0.0491 
(0.9791) 
-0.2504 
(0.0000) 
0.1017 
(0.0000) 
-0.1495 
(0.0003) 
0.1202 
(0.0000) 
-0.2384 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
-0.1660  
(0.0000) 
-0.1699 
(0.0000) 
0.9878 
(0.0000) 
-0.7964 
(0.0000) 
0.5053 
(0.0000) 
-0.7238 
(0.0000) 
0.1055 
(0.0000) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
0.6941 
(0.4877) 
1.6266 
(0.1040) 
1.9681 
(0.0492) 
2.9069 
(0.0037) 
-1.6062 
(0.1084) 
3.6456 
(0.0003) -3.3844 
(0.0007) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
-0.5506 
(0.5820) 
-0.9338 
(0.3505) 
22.8741 
(0.0000) 
-10.4988 
(0.0000) 
4.7511 
(0.0000) 
-4.7506 
(0.0000) 
5.2255 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.1434 0.1020 0.6099 0.4260 0.4656 0.1147 0.4269 
Notes: The table presents the estimates from the following equations:  
CSADt = α0 + α1
UP
D|rm,t| + α2
UP
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
UP
Dr
2
m,t + α4
UP
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt 
 
CSADt = α0 + α1
DOWN
D|rm,t| + α2
DOWN
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
DOWN
Dr
2
m,t + α4
DOWN
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt  
CSAD refers to the cross sectional absolute deviation of returns for each market. The equations are estimated using Newey-
West consistent estimators. D is a dummy assuming the value of one for the days falling within Ramadan each year, zero 
otherwise. P-values are reported in parentheses; the difference in significance between the within- versus outside-Ramadan 
values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics. rm,t refers to the each market’s average return; The superscripts UP 
and DOWN denote that the model is estimated for days of positive (“up domestic market days”) and negative (“down 
domestic market days”) domestic market returns, respectively. 
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Table 5: Estimates of herding for increasing versus decreasing domestic volume days 
(equations 6 and 7). 
Panel A: herding estimates for increasing domestic volume days (equation 6) 
 Bangladesh  Egypt  Indonesia  Malaysia  Morocco  Pakistan  Turkey  
α0
 
0.0142 
(0.0000) 
0.0140 
(0.0000) 
0.0162 
(0.0000) 
0.0144 
(0.0000) 
0.0066 
(0.0000) 
0.0177 
(0.0000) 
0.0163 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.3531 
(0.0000) 
0.1887 
(0.0482) 
0.4450 
(0.0000) 
0.3290 
(0.0000) 
0.8974 
(0.0000) 
0.0705 
(0.4384) 
0.6521 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.2384 
(0.0000) 
0.1998 
(0.0000) 
0.4935 
(0.0000) 
0.4067 
(0.0000) 
0.6890 
(0.0000) 
0.3251 
(0.0000) 
0.4535 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.3645 
(0.0000) 
-0.1156 
(0.6853) 
-0.7234 
(0.0000) 
0.8612 
(0.0000) 
-0.1591 
(0.0003) 
0.3608 
(0.1688) 
-0.3522 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
-0.2410 
(0.0000) 
-0.6847 
(0.0000) 
-0.3304 
(0.0000) 
-0.1660 
(0.0000) 
0.5561 
(0.0000) 
-0.9490 
(0.0000) 
0.1292 
(0.4663) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-1.9940 
(0.04627) 
0.1188 
(0.9055) 
1.2031 
(0.2290) 
3.4538 
(0.0006) 
-2.2326 
(0.0257) 
2.8568 
(0.0043) 
-4.7990 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
3.8801 
(0.0001) 
0.1655 
(0.8685) 
-9.5927 
(0.0000) 
-19.3595 
(0.0000) 
4.8770 
(0.0000) 
-1.7426 
(0.0815) 
9.8018 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.1336 0.0718 0.2522 0.3549 0.4869 0.1353 0.3921 
Panel B: herding estimates for decreasing domestic volume days (equation 7) 
α0
 
0.0136 
(0.0000) 
0.0128 
(0.0000) 
0.0166 
(0.0000) 
0.0122 
(0.0000) 
0.0067 
(0.0000) 
0.0162 
(0.0000) 
0.0145 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.2804 
(0.0000) 
0.3465 
(0.0000) 
0.2759 
(0.0000) 
0.0548 
(0.8337) 
0.8777 
(0.0000) 
-0.0234 
(0.8105) 
0.8127 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.2335 
(0.0000) 
0.4256 
(0.0000) 
0.6088 
(0.0000) 
0.4261 
(0.0466) 
0.7285 
(0.0000) 
0.4003 
(0.0000) 
0.7608 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.1008 
(0.0245) 
-0.2167 
(0.2404) 
-0.2084 
(0.0000) 
0.2545 
(0.7369) 
-0.1568 
(0.0002) 
0.1458 
(0.0000) 
-0.4044 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
0.1099 
(0.0000) 
-0.2629 
(0.0000) 
0.6868 
(0.0000) 
-0.2299 
(0.6125) 
0.6735 
(0.0000) 
-0.1145 
(0.0000) 
-0.3017 
(0.0000) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-0.9386 
(0.3480) 
0.9914 
(0.3216) 
6.5848 
(0.0000) 
1.6056 
(0.1149) 
-1.5537 
(0.1204) 
4.4249 
(0.0000) 
-1.1739 
(0.2405) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
4.7212 
(0.0000) 
0.2507 
(0.8021) 
16.2522 
(0.0000) 
-0.6514 
(0.5179) 
5.2511 
(0.0000) 
-6.0423 
(0.0000) 
1.9421 
(0.0522) 
R
2
 0.7277 0.1521 0.6301 0.4364 0.4791 0.1972 0.4777 
Notes: The table presents the estimates from the following equations:  
CSADt = α0 + α1
UPVol
D|rm,t| + α2
UPVol
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
UPVol
Dr
2
m,t + α4
UPVol
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt 
 
CSADt = α0 + α1
DOWNVol
D|rm,t| + α2
DOWNVol
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
DOWNVol
Dr
2
m,t + α4
DOWNVol
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt 
CSAD refers to the cross sectional absolute deviation of returns for each market. The equations are estimated using Newey-
West consistent estimators. D is a dummy assuming the value of one for the days falling within Ramadan each year, zero 
otherwise. P-values are reported in parentheses. The difference in significance between the within- versus outside-Ramadan 
values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics. rm,t refers to the each market’s average return; The superscripts 
UPVol and DOWNVol denote that the model is estimated for days of increasing and decreasing market volume, 
respectively. 
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Table 6: Estimates of herding for up versus down US market days (equations 8 and 9). 
Panel A: herding estimates for up US market days (equation 8) 
 Bangladesh  Egypt  Indonesia  Malaysia  Morocco  Pakistan  Turkey  
α0
 
0.0139 
(0.0000) 
0.0137 
(0.0000) 
0.0169 
(0.0000) 
0.0144 
(0.0000) 
0.0067 
(0.0000) 
0.0166 
(0.0000) 
0.0141 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.3611 
(0.0000) 
0.2550 
(0.0006) 
0.2442 
(0.0000) 
0.3673 
(0.0000) 
0.8905 
(0.0000) 
0.1646 
(0.0745) 
0.8193 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.2192 
(0.0000) 
0.2374 
(0.0000) 
0.4735 
(0.0000) 
0.3704 
(0.0000) 
0.6864 
(0.0000) 
0.3978 
(0.0000) 
0.7621 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.1484 
(0.0278) 
0.1021 
(0.9531) 
-0.1856 
(0.0000) 
0.7632 
(0.0000) 
-0.1508 
(0.0000) 
0.3149 
(0.2656) 
-0.4047 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
0.2773 
(0.0000) 
-0.7967 
(0.0000) 
0.0850 
(0.0460) 
-0.1317 
(0.0000) 
0.5703 
(0.0000) 
-0.1376 
(0.0000) 
-0.3817 
(0.0000) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-1.9606 
(0.0500) 
-0.2411 
(0.8095) 
4.7052 
(0.0000) 
0.1080 
(0.9140) 
-2.4849 
(0.0130) 
2.5761 
(0.0100) 
-1.3909 
(0.1643) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
2.6207 
(0.0088) 
-0.5189 
(0.6038) 
5.1902 
(0.0000) 
-11.7850 
(0.0000) 
5.7541 
(0.0000) 
1.6027 
(0.1091) 
1.8692 
(0.0638) 
R
2
 0.3074 0.1011 0.3589 0.4178 0.4597 0.1797 0.4485 
Panel B: herding estimates for down US market days (equation 9) 
α0
 
0.0127 
(0.0000) 
0.0130 
(0.0000) 
0.0155 
(0.0000) 
0.0142 
(0.0000) 
0.0067 
(0.0000) 
0.0174 
(0.0000) 
0.0166 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.3013 
(0.0000) 
0.4008 
(0.0003) 
0.5513 
(0.0000) 
0.6260 
(0.0000) 
0.8892 
(0.0000) 
-0.1083 
(0.2743) 
0.6297 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.4039 
(0.0000) 
0.4180 
(0.0000) 
0.6595 
(0.0000) 
0.4594 
(0.0000) 
0.7243 
(0.0000) 
0.3048 
(0.0000) 
0.4624 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.2187 
(0.0000) 
-0.8467 
(0.0096) 
0.8886 
(0.4530) 
-0.8085 
(0.0000) 
-0.1840 
(0.0017) 
0.1353 
(0.0000) 
-0.3424 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
-0.1236 
(0.0000) 
-0.3562 
(0.0000) 
-0.8102 
(0.0000) 
-0.2090 
(0.0000) 
0.6114 
(0.0000) 
-0.6043 
(0.0000) 
0.2428 
(0.1439) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
1.7086 
(0.0877) 
0.1614 
(0.8718) 
1.2682 
(0.2048) 
-2.6461 
(0.0082) 
-1.4212 
(0.1554) 
4.2560 
(0.0000) 
-3.8426 
(0.0001) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
1.8011 
(0.0718) 
1.7103 
(0.0911) 
-1.4381 
(0.1505) 
4.5625 
(0.0000) 
4.1846 
(0.0000) 
-5.6440 
(0.0000) 
9.5934 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.2200 0.1168 0.3111 0.2678 0.5066 0.1621 0.4131 
Notes: The table presents the estimates from the following equations:  
CSADt = α0 + α1
UPUS
D|rm,t| + α2
UPUS
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
UPUS
Dr
2
m,t + α4
UPUS
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt
 
CSADt = α0 + α1
DOWNUS
D|rm,t| + α2
DOWNUS
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
DOWNUS
Dr
2
m,t + α4
DOWNUS
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt   
CSAD refers to the cross sectional absolute deviation of returns for each market. The equations are estimated using Newey-
West consistent estimators. D is a dummy assuming the value of one for the days falling within Ramadan each year, zero 
otherwise. p-values are reported in parentheses. The difference in significance between the within- versus outside-Ramadan 
values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics. rm,t refers to the each market’s average return; The superscripts 
UPUS and DOWNUS denote that the model is estimated for days of positive (“up US market days”) and negative (“down 
US market days”) US market returns, respectively. 
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Table 7: Estimates of herding for up versus down VIX days (equations 10 and 11). 
Panel A: herding estimates for up VIX days (equation 10) 
 Bangladesh  Egypt  Indonesia  Malaysia  Morocco  Pakistan  Turkey  
α0
 
0.0130 
(0.0000) 
0.0137 
(0.0000) 
0.0157 
(0.0000) 
0.0144 
(0.0000) 
0.0064 
(0.0000) 
0.0171 
(0.0000) 
0.0167 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.2405 
(0.0000) 
0.4052 
(0.0000) 
0.3894 
(0.0000) 
0.4769 
(0.0000) 
1.0500 
(0.0000) 
-0.0642 
(0.5093) 
0.6827 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.3703 
(0.0000) 
0.2579 
(0.0000) 
0.6377 
(0.0000) 
0.4228 
(0.0000) 
0.7584 
(0.0000) 
0.3248 
(0.0000) 
0.4782 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.1269 
(0.0030) 
-0.8988 
(0.0029) 
-0. 8613 
(0.0000) 
-0.4614 
(0.0000) 
-0.2363 
(0.0000) 
0.1166 
(0.0000) 
-0.3663 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
-0.1253 
(0.0000) 
-0.8264 
(0.0000) 
-0.2899  
(0.0000) 
-0.1384 
(0.0000) 
0.4163 
(0.0000) 
0.6370 
(0.0000) 
-0.0356 
(0.8385) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
2.3018 
(0.0214) 
1.4932 
(0.1355) 
5.0704 
(0.0000) 
-1.2072 
(0.2274) 
-2.6731 
(0.0076) 
4.0875 
(0.0000) 
-4.6024 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
3.7301 
(0.0000) 
2.7094 
(0.0068) 
-11.7731 
(0.0000) 
5.4385 
(0.0000) 
4.8887 
(0.0000) 
-5.2089 
(0.0000) 
9.1342 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.1817 0.1043 0.3032 0.2887 0.4841 0.1745 0.3978 
Panel B: herding estimates for down VIX days (equation 11) 
α0
 
0.0134 
(0.0000) 
0.0131 
(0.0000) 
0.0169 
(0.0000) 
0.0143 
(0.0000) 
0.0069 
(0.0000) 
0.0169 
(0.0000) 
0.0144 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.4396 
(0.0000) 
0.2576 
(0.0014) 
0.5303 
(0.0000) 
0.4573 
(0.0000) 
0.8059 
(0.0000) 
0.1968 
(0.0640) 
0.7446 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.2802 
(0.0000) 
0.3343 
(0.0000) 
0.4557 
(0.0000) 
0.4182 
(0.0000) 
0.6600 
(0.0000) 
0.3803 
(0.0000) 
0.6953 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.2180 
(0.2020) 
0.2479 
(0.8938) 
-0.3784 
(0.0001) 
0.5656 
(0.0000) 
-0.1083 
(0.0063) 
0.1243 
(0.7459) 
-0.3748 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
0.1972 
(0.0000) 
-0.2047 
(0.0000) 
0.8489 
(0.0000) 
-0.2171 
(0.0000) 
0.7800 
(0.0000) 
-0.1299 
(0.0000) 
-0.2706 
(0.0000) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-1.5854 
(0.1130) 
0.9767 
(0.3288) 
-1.0078 
(0.3136) 
-1.2671 
(0.2052) 
-1.6432 
(0.1005) 
1.7572 
(0.0790) 
-1.1775 
(0.2391) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
1.3942 
(0.1634) 
-1.2380 
(0.2158) 
4.8079 
(0.0000) 
-15.9713 
(0.0000) 
4.6808 
(0.0000) 
0.6635 
(0.5071) 
1.9840 
(0.0473) 
R
2
 0.3318 0.1113 0.5527 0.4406 0.4973 0.1654 0.4514 
Notes: The table presents the estimates from the following equations:  
CSADt = α0 + α1
UPVIX
D|rm,t| + α2
UPVIX
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
UPVIX
Dr
2
m,t + α4
UPVIX
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt
 
CSADt = α0 + α1
DOWNVIX
D|rm,t| + α2
DOWNVIX
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
DOWNVIX
Dr
2
m,t + α4
DOWNVIX
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt 
CSAD refers to the cross sectional absolute deviation of returns for each market. The equations are estimated using Newey-
West consistent estimators. D is a dummy assuming the value of one for the days falling within Ramadan each year, zero 
otherwise. p-values are reported in parentheses. The difference in significance between the within- versus outside-Ramadan 
values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics. rm,t refers to the each market’s average return; The superscripts 
UPVIX and DOWNVIX denote that the model is estimated for days of increasing and decreasing VIX values, respectively. 
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Table 8: Estimates of herding before and after the crisis’ outbreak (equations 12 and 13). 
Panel A: herding estimates pre outbreak (equation 12) 
 Bangladesh  Egypt  Indonesia  Malaysia  Morocco  Pakistan  Turkey  
α0
 
0.0126 
(0.0000) 
0.0140 
(0.0000) 
0.0154 
(0.0000) 
0.0134 
(0.0000) 
0.0054 
(0.0000) 
0.0157 
(0.0000) 
0.0168 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.4425 
(0.0000) 
0.2476 
(0.0538) 
0.6289 
(0.0000) 
0.3473 
(0.0000) 
1.0512 
(0.0000) 
-0.0182 
(0.8147) 
0.7703 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.3040 
(0.0000) 
0.3024 
(0.0000) 
0.6701 
(0.0000) 
0.4243 
(0.0000) 
0.8012 
(0.0000) 
0.3839 
(0.0000) 
0.5530 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.2295 
(0.0000) 
-0.4183 
(0.9460) 
-0.4737 
(0.0000) 
0.8176 
(0.0000) 
-0.2470 
(0.0000) 
0.1132 
(0.0000) 
-0.6679 
(0.0000) 
α4
 
0.1368 
(0.0000) 
-0.9978 
(0.0000) 
-0.4628  
(0.0000) 
-0.1360 
(0.0000) 
0.5465 
(0.0000) 
-0.1075 
(0.0000) 
-0.4101  
(0.0000) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
-2.1588 
(0.0309) 
0.4340 
(0.6643) 
0.8091 
(0.4185) 
3.3500 
(0.0008) 
-2.8750 
(0.0041) 
5.2821 
(0.0000) 
-6.3829 
(0.0000) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
4.5365 
(0.0000) 
-0.0938 
(0.9252) 
-0.2268 
(0.8206) 
15.5397 
(0.0000) 
6.1571 
(0.0000) 
-5.6812 
(0.0000) 
10.5347 
(0.0000) 
R
2
 0.3007 0.1107 0.3512 0.4346 0.5682 0.1912 0.4122 
Panel B: herding estimates post outbreak (equation 13) 
α0
 
0.0174 
(0.0000) 
0.0123 
(0.0000) 
0.0165 
(0.0000) 
0.0175 
(0.0000) 
0.0112 
(0.0000) 
0.0194 
(0.0000) 
0.0141 
(0.0000) 
α1
 
0.0467 
(0.4627) 
0.2550 
(0.0023) 
0.3636 
(0.0000) 
0.3168 
(0.0147) 
0.3236 
(0.0000) 
0.1782 
(0.1353) 
0.2355 
(0.0000) 
α2
 
0.1407 
(0.0000) 
0.2482 
(0.0000) 
0.4782 
(0.0000) 
0.3211 
(0.0000) 
0.3479 
(0.0000) 
0.4501 
(0.0000) 
0.2889 
(0.0000) 
α3
 
-0.2010 
(0.0502) 
-0.1036 
(0.5522) 
-0.4826 
(0.0000) 
-0.4029 
(0.3841) 
-0.5381 
(0.8636) 
0.2857 
(0.3683) 
-0.3662 
(0.3987) 
α4
 
-0.1133 
(0.0013) 
-0.1178 
(0.0023) 
-0.3626  
(0.0000) 
-0.2639 
(0.0000) 
0.1233 
(0.5627) 
-0.2444 
(0.0000) 
-0.7424 
(0.0028) 
t-stat1 
(H0:α1 = α2) 
1.5256 
(0.1273) 
-0.0835 
(0.9335) 
2.1721 
(0.0300) 
0.0341 
(0.9728) 
0.3025 
(0.7623) 
2.3431 
(0.0193) 
1.6520 
(0.0988) 
t-stat2 
(H0:α3 = α4) 
0.8410 
(0.4005) 
-0.0823 
(0.9344) 
-2.0698 
(0.0386) 
0.3015 
(0.7631) 
0.5058 
(0.6130) 
-1.6792 
(0.0933) 
-0.7957 
(0.4263) 
R
2
 0.0381 0.1173 0.1783 0.0950 0.2117 0.1544 0.4364 
Notes: The table presents the estimates from the following equations:  
CSADt = α0 + α1
PREOUTBREAK
D|rm,t| + α2
PREOUTBREAK
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
PREOUTBREAK
Dr
2
m,t + α4
PREOUTBREAK
(1-D)r
2
m,t + εt
 
CSADt = α0 + α1
POSTOUTBREAK
D|rm,t| + α2
POSTOUTBREAK
(1-D)|rm,t| + α3
POSTOUTBREAK
Dr
2
m,t + α4
POSTOUTBREAK
(1-D)r
2
m,t 
+ εt  
CSAD refers to the cross sectional absolute deviation of returns for each market. The equations are estimated using Newey-
West consistent estimators. D is a dummy assuming the value of one for those days falling within Ramadan each year, zero 
otherwise. P-values are reported in parentheses. The difference in significance between the within- versus outside-Ramadan 
values of each coefficient is tested using t-test statistics. rm,t refers to the each market’s average return; The superscripts 
PREOUTBREAK and POSTOUTBREAK denote that the model is estimated prior to and after the outbreak of the crisis, 
respectively. 
 
